Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects?

Abstract

The work that has been done in the metaphysics of material objects over the past twenty or so years is full of creativity guided by the hand of rigor.In what follows, I have no desire to disparage it.Nonetheless, at the end of the day, I think the best interpretation of these good works is as developing and showing how one or more scheme of description-one 'package' account of what there is, how things change and trace through time ~and possible worlds!and how our 'ordinary' views on these matters fit in-can ~or can't!be coherently worked out.More simply, I will argue that there is no fact of the matter about which package is true-each is metaphysically as good as the others, and the world is incapable of discriminating among them.How best to articulate this position will be considered in the final section of this paper.In Section I, I will discuss the most prominent views in the area, illustrating what I mean by a 'package', and claiming that for each view, there is an acceptable package that meets standard objections and all clear requirements.I hope this rehearsal of views and packages will provide some intuitive force to the idea that these packages don't really make different claims about the world, but just provide different ways of describing the material contents of spacetime ~including property instantiations and causal relations!.Thus, the differences between the views look more semantic than factual.In Section II, I will argue that there is nothing in the world that could make for the truth of one of these views as opposed to the others, 1 although each provides an acceptable way of describing the world.Finally, I will consider some objections to and questions raised by my proposal. 2 I. The Views BackgroundMuch recent work in this area has been guided by puzzles that aim to show that not all of our ordinary views about what there is, and how things