Journal of Political Economy · 2014 · 217 citations · 41 references
Group IncomesConflict StudiesIslamic EconomicsEconomic DevelopmentInternational RelationsConflict StudySociologyHindu-muslim ViolenceIntergroup ConflictConflict TheoryInternational ConflictFuture Religious ConflictPolitical ConflictSocial SciencesCivil Conflict
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups and apply the model to data on Hindu‑Muslim violence in India. When group incomes are low, raising Muslim per‑capita expenditures increases future religious conflict, while increasing Hindu expenditures has no or a negative effect, indicating that economic changes drive Hindu‑Muslim violence in post‑Independence India.
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect. These findings speak to the origins of Hindu-Muslim violence in post-Independence India.
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