Pi: a path identification mechanism to defend against DDoS attacks

A. Yaar, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song

2004 · 416 citations · 27 references

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Concepts

TL;DR

Distributed denial‑of‑service attacks remain a pervasive threat, and spoofed source IP addresses make it difficult to identify the true origin of packets, while Pi introduces several unique properties to address this challenge. The authors propose Pi, a packet‑marking scheme that embeds a path fingerprint in each packet so that victims can identify packets traversing the same path regardless of source‑IP spoofing. Pi is a per‑packet deterministic mechanism that attaches the same identifier to all packets on a given path, enabling victims to filter attackers’ packets with negligible state, and its design was validated through traceroute‑based simulations on real Internet topologies. The Pi scheme remains effective against large‑scale DDoS attacks involving thousands of attackers and works even when only half of the Internet’s routers participate in packet marking.

Abstract

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague the Internet. Defense against these attacks is complicated by spoofed source IP addresses, which make it difficult to determine a packet's true origin. We propose Pi (short for path identifier), a new packet marking approach in which a path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim to identify packets traversing the same paths through the Internet on a per packet basis, regardless of source IP address spoofing. Pi features many unique properties. It is a per-packet deterministic mechanism: each packet traveling along the same path carries the same identifier This allows the victim to take a proactive role in defending against a DDoS attack by using the Pi mark to filter out packets matching the attackers' identifiers on a per packet basis. The Pi scheme performs well under large-scale DDoS attacks consisting of thousands of attackers, and is effective even when only half the routers in the Internet participate in packet marking. Pi marking and filtering are both extremely lightweight and require negligible state. We use traceroute maps of real Internet topologies (e.g. CAIDA's Skitter (2000) and Burch and Cheswick's Internet Map (1999, 2002)) to simulate DDoS attacks and validate our design.

References

27