Macroeconomic Effects From Government Purchases and Taxes *

Robert J. Barro, Charles Redlick

The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2011 · 855 citations · 22 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Estimated multipliers for defense spending are below one, indicating crowd‑out of investment, and reliable multipliers for non‑defense purchases are hard to obtain because of reverse causation from GDP. The study finds that temporary defense spending raises GDP by 0.4–0.5 per dollar (0.6–0.7 over two years), permanent spending by 0.1–0.2 more, while higher marginal tax rates lower GDP with a multiplier of about 1.1, implying a negative balanced‑budget multiplier and that tax effects are driven mainly by substitution.

Abstract

For U.S. annual data that include World War II, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0.4–0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6–0.7 over 2 years. If the change in defense spending is “permanent” (gauged by Ramey's defense news variable), the multipliers are higher by 0.1–0.2. Since all estimated multipliers are significantly less than 1, greater spending crowds out other components of GDP, particularly investment. The lack of good instruments prevents estimation of reliable multipliers for nondefense purchases; multipliers in the literature of two or more likely reflect reverse causation from GDP to nondefense purchases. Increases in average marginal income tax rates (measured by a newly constructed time series) have significantly negative effects on GDP. When interpreted as a tax multiplier, the magnitude is around 1.1. The combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that the balanced-budget multiplier for defense spending is negative. We have some evidence that tax changes affect GDP mainly through substitution effects, rather than wealth effects.

References

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