Rationality and Society · 1993 · 39 citations · 10 references
Social SciencesBehavioral SciencesEvolutionary BiologyEvolutionary PsychologyGame TheoryProsocial BehaviorBehavioral Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorEvolution Of CooperationAltruism EvolutionCooperation In Social DilemmasEvolution Of Social Behavior
Two types of emotions can be distinguished: the affections (stable patterns of malevolence or benevolence toward particular others) and the passions (action-dependent responses to friendly/unfriendly acts). Either type may serve to induce cooperation from a self-interested party, subject to several limitations. Shakespeare's King Lear is examined as an instance where benevolence fails to elicit cooperation. To meet the necessary condition for evolutionary survival in competition with rational self-interested players, the emotional party must benefit not only in “feel good” utility terms but in actual material payoff. SILVER RULE, as an instance of reactive passionate behavior related to the familiar TIT FOR TAT behavior, is shown to lose out in evolutionary competition against RATIONAL play unless the SILVER RULE player has a sufficiently high probability of being able to detect when his opponent is a selfish RATIONAL player.
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