Concepedia

Publication | Closed Access

Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats

1.5K

Citations

43

References

2007

Year

TLDR

The study examines why some autocrats endure for decades while others fall quickly, arguing that institutions that solicit outsider cooperation or deter rebellion—such as partisan legislatures—extend their tenure by broadening support. The authors analyze every authoritarian ruler in power from 1946 to 1996 to assess the impact of nominally democratic institutions on survival. The analysis shows that such institutions lengthen autocrats’ tenures.

Abstract

Why do some autocrats survive for decades, and others fall soon after taking power? The authors argue that when authoritarian rulers need to solicit the cooperation of outsiders or deter the threat of rebellion, they rely on political institutions. Partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, giving them a stake in the ruler's survival. By broadening the basis of support for autocrats, these institutions lengthen their tenures. An analysis of all authoritarian rulers in power during the 1946-1996 period provides evidence of the effect of nominally democratic institutions on their political survival.

References

YearCitations

Page 1