Low-rate TCP-targeted denial of service attacks and counter strategies

Aleksandar Kuzmanovic, Edward W. Knightly

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking · 2006 · 196 citations · 36 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Denial‑of‑service attacks increasingly threaten global networking, and although TCP’s congestion control is robust, its assumption of end‑system cooperation leaves it vulnerable to high‑rate non‑responsive flows. This study investigates low‑rate DoS attacks that evade detection and examines the limits of randomized timeout mechanisms for mitigation. The authors employ analytical models, simulations, and Internet experiments to demonstrate that low‑rate traffic exploiting TCP’s retransmission timeout can throttle flows while evading detection, and analyze randomized timeout defenses. Malicious low‑rate traffic exploiting TCP’s retransmission timeout can throttle flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate while evading detection, and randomized timeout mechanisms have fundamental limits in thwarting such attacks.

Abstract

Denial of Service attacks are presenting an increasing threat to the global inter-networking infrastructure. While TCP's congestion control algorithm is highly robust to diverse network conditions, its implicit assumption of end-system cooperation results in a well-known vulnerability to attack by high-rate non-responsive flows. In this paper, we investigate a class of low-rate denial of service attacks which, unlike high-rate attacks, are difficult for routers and counter-DoS mechanisms to detect. Using a combination of analytical modeling, simulations, and Internet experiments, we show that maliciously chosen low-rate DoS traffic patterns that exploit TCP's retransmission timeout mechanism can throttle TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate while eluding detection. Moreover, as such attacks exploit protocol homogeneity, we study fundamental limits of the ability of a class of randomized timeout mechanisms to thwart such low-rate DoS attacks

References

36