Reliable and Error Detection Architectures of Pomaranch for False-Alarm-Sensitive Cryptographic Applications

Abstract

Efficient cryptographic architectures are used extensively in sensitive smart infrastructures. Among these architectures are those based on stream ciphers for protection against eavesdropping, especially when these smart and sensitive applications provide life-saving or vital mechanisms. Nevertheless, natural defects call for protection through design for fault detection and reliability. In this paper, we present implications of fault detection cryptographic architectures (Pomaranch in the hardware profile of European Network of Excellence for Cryptology) for smart infrastructures. In addition, we present low-power architectures for its nine-to-seven uneven substitution box [tower field architectures in GF(3 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">3</sup> )]. Through error simulations, we assess resiliency against false-alarms which might not be tolerated in sensitive intelligent infrastructures as one of our contributions. We further benchmark the feasibility of the proposed approaches through application-specific integrated circuit realizations. Based on the reliability objectives, the proposed architectures are a step-forward toward reaching the desired objective metrics suitable for intelligent, emerging, and sensitive applications.