The Journal of Politics · 2010 · 82 citations · 35 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceAmerican PoliticsLegislative PoliticsPolitical BehaviorAgenda-setting AnalysisElectionsLegislative Agenda-settingLegislative ElectionsRoll-call VotingVoting BehaviorAnnual Appropriations BillsDimensionality Of Voting BehaviorElectronic Roll Call VotingFinite DimensionalityLegislative Voting BehaviorMultidimensional Issue VotingRoll-call Vote AnalysisVoting Behaviour
One of the fundamental findings in the congressional literature is that one or sometimes two dimensions can successfully describe roll-call voting. In this paper we investigate if we can reach the same conclusions about low dimensionality when we divide the roll-call agenda into subsets of relatively homogeneous subject matter. We are primarily interested in the degree to which the same ordering of representatives is yielded across these different groups of votes. To conduct our analysis we focus on all roll calls on the 13 annual appropriations bills across eight congresses. When we concentrate on these smaller issue areas, we find that voting is multidimensional and members do not vote in a consistent ideological fashion across all issue areas.
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