Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market

TLDR

Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. The study presents a model where schooling investment yields both labor‑market and marriage‑market returns. The model links schooling to higher wages and to a marriage‑market surplus share. The model shows that wage asymmetries can create a mixed equilibrium with educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses, and that higher labor‑market returns reduce home‑production demands, weaken traditional labor‑division norms, and increase female schooling. JEL codes: I21, J12, J24, J31.

Abstract

We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men. (JEL I21, J12, J24, J31)