International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium · 2006 · 28 citations · 5 references
ComputingComputer ScienceComputer SystemsComputer SecurityNetwork SecurityWeb SecurityDomain Name SystemSuspicious Activity DetectionAnomaly Detection In RoutingAutonomous System RoutingBgp Route ControlBgp SecurityPath HijackingRouting Prefixes
Google went down for 15 to 60 minutes around 22:10, May 07, 2005 UTC. This was explained by Google as having been caused by internal DNS misconfigurations. Another vulnerable protocol which could have caused such service outage is BGP. To pursue the latter possibility further, we explore how BGP was functioning during that period of time using the RouteViews BGP data set. Interestingly, our investigation reveals that one autonomous system (i.e., AS 174 operated by Cogent), which is apparently independent from Google, mysteriously originated routes for one of the IP prefixes assigned to Google (134.233.161.0/24) immediately prior to the service outage. As a result, 49.1% of ASes re-advertising routes for 64.233.161.0/24 switched to the incorrect path. Those poisoned ASes directly serve 1500 IP prefixes, and span a broad range of geographic locations. Since this erroneous prefix origination apparently has not occurred previously, or after this specific instance, we consider that it might have been the result of malicious activity (e.g., compromise of one or more BGP speakers) and contributed at least partially to Google's service outage.
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