The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues

Unknown author(s)

Journal of Sports Economics · 2002 · 133 citations · 4 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In most professional sports leagues, the worst teams in higher divisions are relegated while the best teams in lower divisions are promoted. The article examines the economics of promotion and relegation using data from English football. The system places teams in leagues where they cannot afford a winning squad, causing them to spend less on players during brief stays in higher leagues than during attempts to be promoted from lower leagues. Players earn higher wages, attendance rises, competitive balance effects are ambiguous, and the study discusses potential North American implementation.

Abstract

In most of the world’s professional sports leagues, the worst teams in better leagues are demoted while the best teams in weaker leagues are promoted. This article examines the economics of promotion and relegation, using data from English football (soccer). The crucial findings are as follows: players earn higher wages under promotion and relegation, promotion and relegation has a net positive effect on attendance, and the effect of promotion and relegation on competitive balance is ambiguous. The unbalancing effect arises because the system places some teams in leagues in which they have no realistic chance to afford a winning team, thereby causing teams to spend less on players during their (brief) stay in a higher league than they spent while trying to be promoted from as lesser league. The article concludes with an analysis of how promotion and relegation might be implemented in North America.

References

4