BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: THE FUTILIn OF CLEANUPS

Abstract

Recent interest in the political dimension of economic growth has had a significant impact on the study of the behavior of bureaucrats and how their activities affect macroeconomic performance. Most of the research has been devoted to the study ofbureaucratic compensa-tion (Kimenyi 1987; Mbaku 1991a; Couch, Atkinson, and Shughart 1992) and bureaucratic corruption. Little attention, however, has been given the problem of corruption cleanups. An effective cleanup program can be designed and implemented, but only if the researcher puts bureaucratic corruption in the right context. Unless it is understood that bureaucratic corruption is oppor-tunistic (rent-seeking) behavior and is rebated to the scope and extent of government regulation of economic activities, cleanup programs are unbikeby to succeed. This study examines bureaucratic corruption and cleanup strategies in Africa and seeks to advance the public-choice approach as the most effective and intellectually sastiI~4ng framework for corruption cleanup. In Africa, bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensa-tion by lobbying lawmakers and politicians and by engaging in other aetivites to influence the political system and maximize benefits accru-ing to them. Many civil servants also illegally increase their compensa-tion by providing services to interest groups that seek favors from the government. Political coalitions seeking ways to subvert the existing rules to redistribute national income and wealth in their favor can achieve their objectives bybribing civil servantswhose job is to enforce state regulations and implement national development plans. If