The Cambridge Law Journal · 1999 · 63 citations · 0 references
LawAdministrative LawConstitutional LawConstitutional InterpretationConstitutional TheoryJudicial ReviewConstitutional SupremacyParliamentary SovereigntyRule Of LawUltra Vires DoctrineUltra Vires ReviewAbsolute Legislative SupremacyAdministrative Law ReviewConstitutional Ultra ViresJudge-made LawSubstantive Ultra ViresUltra Vires ActionUltra Vires Rulemaking
English law scholars disagree on whether judicial review is grounded in Parliament’s intent or in a judge‑made common‑law tradition, with the ultra vires doctrine and its alternatives occupying opposite ends of the spectrum. The study aims to situate the ultra vires interpretive method within constitutional context and to formulate a judicial‑review explanation that respects parliamentary supremacy while addressing the doctrine’s limitations. The authors achieve this by integrating ultra vires interpretation into constitutional analysis and emphasizing the rule of law in statutory construction.
There is currently a good deal of disagreement concerning the constitutional justification for judicial review in English law. The ultra vires doctrine holds that review is simply a function of legislative intention. In contrast, a number of commentators argue that administrative law is a body of judge-made common law which is unrelated to the will of Parliament. The truth lies somewhere between these two poles. The traditional ultra vires doctrine is unsatisfactory because, inter alia , it is unrealistic to assert that judicial review constitutes nothing more than the implementation of legislative intention. However, the attempt of some commentators to exclude intention from the justification for review is equally deficient since this is an affront to the sovereignty of Parliament. By locating the interpretative methodology of ultra vires within its proper constitutional setting and by recognising the importance of the rule of law to the process of statutory construction, it is possible to articulate an explanation of judicial review which is consistent with Parliament's legislative supremacy while avoiding the shortcomings of the traditional ultra vires principle (notably its inability satisfactorily to explain the derivation of the grounds of review; the courts' treatment of ouster clauses; the development of administrative law across time, and the extension of judicial review to non-statutory powers).