The Resurrecting Duckling: security issues for ubiquitous computing

TLDR

Ubiquitous computing envisions hundreds of embedded devices per person linked via ad hoc wireless networks, but intermittent connectivity and many principals make traditional authentication schemes like Kerberos or public‑key certificates ineffective, raising concerns about confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The paper explores new solutions to these security challenges. It introduces the Resurrecting Duckling security policy model.

Abstract

Imagine the future: hundreds of embedded computers per person, all cooperating via ad hoc wireless networks. What will the security implications be? Peer-to-peer and ubiquitous computing systems involve many principals, but their network connectivity is intermittent and not guaranteed. Traditional approaches to authentication, from Kerberos to public-key certificates, are therefore unworkable, because they rely on online connectivity to an authentication or revocation server. The paper considers new solutions. It discusses the Resurrecting Duckling security policy model. The traditional taxonomy of security threats identifies three main classes which are considered: confidentiality, integrity or availability.