Publication | Open Access
Is Moral Obligation Objective or Subjective?
120
Citations
0
References
2006
Year
Normative AnalysisMoral ReasoningPerceived MaximizationActual ValueMoral NormsNormative IssuePerceived EthicalityValue TheoryMoral IssueLawNormative EthicSocial SciencesMoral Obligation ObjectiveNormative TheoryBroad ViewsRelationship EthicsEthical PracticeMoral Psychology
Philosophers debate whether moral obligation is objective or subjective, and some argue it could be both, offering a potential answer to the dilemma of acting when the right action is unknown. The article distinguishes three views of moral obligation: maximizing actual value, maximizing expected value, and maximizing perceived actual value. The authors reject the first and third views and refine the second, defending a perspective that moral obligation concerns maximizing expected value. The study finds that no definitive answer emerges, and whether obligation is objective or subjective depends on how those terms are defined.
Many philosophers hold that whether an act is overall morally obligatory is an ‘objective’ matter, many that it is a ‘subjective’ matter, and some that it is both. The idea that it is or can be both may seem to promise a helpful answer to the question ‘What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?’ In this article, three broad views are distinguished regarding what it is that obligation essentially concerns: the maximization of actual value, the maximization of expected value, and the perceived maximization of actual value. The first and third views are rejected; the second view is then refined and defended. The unfortunate upshot is that there may be no very helpful answer to the question just mentioned. As to the question posed in the title of the article, the answer unsurprisingly depends on what ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are taken to mean.