IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing · 2009 · 249 citations · 31 references
EngineeringElectrical EngineeringDigital CommunicationGame TheoryWireless CommunicationsCooperative CommunicationMatrix ComputationWireless Channel ModelingComputational Game TheoryInterference ChannelMimoMimo Channel CharacterizationMimo SystemsNash Equilibrium ProblemsNon-cooperative GamesUniqueness Conditions
This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">arbitrary</i> channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">arbitrary</i> channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.
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