The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2005 · 349 citations · 28 references
Social SciencesEconomicsPolitical ScienceDevelopment EconomicsPolitical EconomySociology Of ReligionChurch-state RelationsReligious InstitutionsSpatial Distribution Of ReligionsAdherenceEstablishment Of ReligionHotelling ModelHotelling Price Competition
Among 188 countries, 72 had no state religion across 1900–2000, 58 had a state religion throughout, and 58 experienced one or two transitions, reflecting that similar forces influence governments’ decisions to establish a state religion. The study uses a Hotelling spatial competition model to analyze the likelihood that the religion market would be monopolized. The authors employ a Hotelling spatial competition model to assess the probability of a state religion monopolizing the religious market. The model predicts that the probability of a state religion in 1970 and 2000 rises with the adherence rate to the main religion, follows a nonlinear relation with population, is largely unrelated to per capita GDP, falls sharply under Communism (with only a weak lagged effect), and depends substantially on the 1900 status, with stronger persistence in countries without major regime change.
Among 188 countries, 72 had no state religion in 2000,1970, and 1900; 58 had a state religion throughout; and 58 had 1 or 2 transitions. We use a Hotelling spatial competition model to analyze the likelihood that the religion market would be monopolized. Similar forces influence a government's decision to establish a state religion. Consistent with the model, the probability of state religion in 1970 and 2000 is increasing with the adherence rate to the main religion, has a nonlinear relation with population, and has little relation with per capita GDP. The probability of state religion decreases sharply under Communism, but lagged Communism has only a weak effect. With costly adjustment for institutions, the probability of state religion in 1970 or 2000 depends substantially on the status in 1900. This persistence is much stronger for countries with no major regime change than for countries with such a change.
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Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1998 · 18.1K citations
Law, Corporate Governance, Finance +14
Harold Hotelling · The Economic Journal · 1929 · 6.8K citations