Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods

TLDR

Moods differ from emotions by being diffuse and global, and are understood as temporary dispositions to hold specific emotion‑relevant appraisals that partly constitute the mood experience. The article proposes a dispositional theory of moods that explains this diffuse, global nature and outlines its implications and supporting empirical findings. Empirical evidence presented supports the dispositional theory, demonstrating that moods function as temporary dispositions influencing emotion‑relevant appraisals.

Abstract

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory.