European Union Politics · 2001 · 208 citations · 25 references
Social SciencesPublic PolicyRegulatory PolicyAdministrative DiscretionRegulatory ComplianceState ResponsibilityEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean LawEuropean PoliticsInternational CooperationLegal ComplianceBinomial RegressionCompliance By Member StatesCompliance With Supranational LawCount Data AnalysisNegative Binomial DistributionNegative Binomial ModelsNegative Binomial RegressionReluctance
EU member states sometimes fail to implement directives, undermining the cooperative foundation of the EU. The study investigates why states resist compliance, arguing that cross‑national factors, not idiosyncratic traits, drive non‑compliance. The author formulates testable hypotheses and applies negative binomial regression to count‑data on infringements to evaluate them. Results provide modest support for many hypotheses, with bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, ministerial power, economic strength, membership tenure, and public approval emerging as key predictors of compliance.
European Union (EU) member states have at times failed to implement EU directives, thus falling short of their treaty obligations. Implementation is crucial to this loosely quasifederal organization because compliance is the foundation of cooperation in Europe. This paper addresses the inability of states to comply and state reluctance to conform. I demonstrate that cross-national factors rather than idiosyncratic characteristics are responsible for non-compliance. I have crafted hypotheses regarding implementation that can be tested in a systematic fashion. Using count data of infringements, I use negative binomial regression to test the hypotheses. I find modest support for many of the hypotheses in the literature, but little support for others. Bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, power in the Council of Ministers, economic power, length of membership, and public approval of EU membership are the most important predictors of compliance.
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