The Journal of Environment & Development · 1999 · 185 citations · 25 references
Social SciencesEconomicsEnvironmental PolicyInternational EconomicsInternational Political EconomyInternational TradeEnvironmental StandardsInternational Competition PolicyStandard-setting AgreementsStandards StrategyTrade LiberalizationTrade RegulationGlobal Standard-settingHarmonization Of Regulatory StandardsIndustrial Emission StandardsIndustrial Environmental StandardsInternational Standards HarmonizationStandardization DynamicsStandardization Of GoodsStandards
A major argument for upward harmonization of national industrial pollution standards is that unregulated trade competition among countries with wide disparities in standards will exert downward pressure on standards, particularly in the countries with the most stringent standards (the “race to bottom” thesis). But empirical evidence indicates that it is in the rapidly industrializing countries themselves, rather than in the countries with higher standards, that competitiveness concerns exert downward pressure on standards, creating a “stuck at the bottom” problem. The greater sensitivity of rapidly industrializing countries to competitiveness pressures can be explained by the unresponsiveness of their political institutions. This article calls for a radically different approach to the problem of standards and trade competition, proposing an agreement on common minimum standards to be negotiated solely among the rapidly industrializing countries themselves.
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