Is the Future more or less Human? Differing Views of Humanness in the Posthumanism Debate

TLDR

A debate in bioethics has arisen over using biotechnology to modify human nature, but the lack of a clear definition of humanness has caused conceptual confusion. The authors analyze rival positions on human nature modification by drawing on social psychological work on folk concepts of humanness and dehumanization, arguing that advocates and opponents use distinct conceptions of humanness that explain their differing evaluations. They analyze rival positions by applying social psychological theories of folk concepts of humanness and dehumanization. The study finds that advocates see modification as enhancing a non‑essentialist sense of humanness moving away from animal nature, while opponents view it as losing an essentialist sense of humanness toward a robotic state, and that recognizing multiple senses of humanness means the outcome cannot be framed as either a quantitative gain or a qualitative loss.

Abstract

A debate has emerged in the bioethics literature about the use of biotechnology to modify human nature. A failure to define humanness has produced conceptual confusion in this debate. We draw upon recent social psychological work on folk concepts of humanness and dehumanization to analyse the understandings of humanness that underpin the rival positions. We argue that advocates and opponents of human nature modification employ distinct conceptions of humanness, and that their differing evaluations of modification make sense in light of these conceptions. Advocates view modification as the enhancement of a non‐essentialist sense of humanness that takes us further from animal nature. Opponents view it as the loss of an essentialist sense of humanness that takes us closer to a robotic state. Recognition that humanness has multiple senses implies that there is no mutually exclusive choice between seeing the outcome of modification as a quantitative gain in humanness or a fundamental, qualitative loss of it.