The Journal of Philosophy · 2014 · 75 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesPhilosophySocial PsychologyBehavioral EconomicsMoral PsychologySocial PerceptionMoral JudgmentValue AssessmentSubjective ValueValue JudgmentsValue Orientations
The paper argues that the relationship between value and worth‑valuation is an a priori necessary truth: objects with value are worth valuing, where valuing is a stable conative attitude distinct from mere judgment. This paper explores the relationship between ascribing value to an object and assessing conative attitudes toward it, questioning what kind of attitude assessment is at stake and how the worth‑relation between object and attitude should be understood, aiming to identify a mind‑world relation that marks success in directing valuing energies rather than meeting deontic, representational, or evaluative criteria. The authors argue that deontological, evaluative, and alethic eluciations of the worth‑relation are wrongheaded.
This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? How are we to understand the worth-relation that holds between an object and the attitude? It is argued that deontological, evaluative and alethic eluciations of the worth-relation are wrongheaded. We should be looking for a mind-world relation that marks a success in how the emotional and motivational energies integral to valuing are directed: a success that does not consist in meeting a deontic requirement, in exemplifying value, or in representing truly.