Cambridge Journal of Economics · 2012 · 44 citations · 24 references
Social SciencesEconomicsFinanceEconomic HistoryEconomic PolicyPolitical EconomyFinancial CrisesGlobal Political EconomyInternational Monetary RelationsMonetary HistoryMonetary PolicyAusterity RegimesCrisis PolicymakingHistory Of Macroeconomic ThoughtInternational Finance HistoryMonetary Policy History
The world faces an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. But much of the policy response has certainly not lacked for precedent. National governments and international organisations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have looked to crises of the past for solutions to the present—and austerity has become a familiar theme. The inability to effectively resolve the current crisis, however, gives rise to the question: ‘Is this time different?’ This article provides a broad overview to the origins and development of the recent economic crisis and the resort to policies of austerity. Although there is historical precedent for the resort to austerity—such as the UK ‘Treasury view’ during the 1920s and 1930s—this time, things are different. Many of the current problems are deeply rooted and reflect the impact of the shift towards free-market economics that started in the 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the private sector—finance, in particular—has reorganised on an increasingly global scale. It has innovated in terms of both structure and products, and it has experienced significant growth. As Tridico (2012, this issue) shows, this ‘financialisation’ was characterised by a ballooning of stock exchanges, as many firms decided not only to list their shares but also to become involved in speculative finance. In response to pressures on firms to maximise shareholder value, together with the progressive erosion of worker and trade union rights and influence, labour markets became more flexible and real wages stagnated. Concurrently, profits rebounded, leading to burgeoning inequality. In this context, aggregate demand and consumption were bolstered by easy credit and the wealth effects of speculative bubbles—first in stocks and shares, and then in housing. In contrast to capital’s increasing global reach, political, legal and regulatory systems have remained for the most part resolutely national. International agreement has been intermittent, short-lived and relatively slow to mobilise. This mismatch has been accompanied by ideological uniformity, with the neoliberal paradigm virtually unchallenged among policymakers and mainstream economists, despite recognition of its contribution to the current crisis (Watkins, 2010; Montgomerie and Williams, 2009). The resulting consistency, in terms of both the policy message and its demands, has resulted in low levels of official opposition to—or even questioning of—the primacy of markets. This pattern is reflected in the evolution of political and economic responses to the current financial crisis, which began in 2008, but has so far proven stubbornly resistant to all efforts to resolve it. The evolving political and economic responses to the developing crisis have demonstrated that this time the situation is, indeed, different. The collapse of Bear Stearns and its subsequent sale to JP Morgan at a knockdown price of $2.00 a share was reminiscent of the swift action taken to avert a wider collapse during the UK’s 1970s secondary banking crisis and the USA’s Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the consequences of allowing an internationally significant bank, Lehman Brothers, to collapse in 2008 ushered in a new era. Unlike previous occasions since World War II, when financial crises were more or less contained, the international markets’ reaction to the Lehman Brothers’ collapse spilled over into the real economy. This resulted in an unprecedented package of internationally coordinated emergency monetary and fiscal stimuli, followed by a series of massive government bailouts of banks and other financial institutions.1 As Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, observed: banks are ‘global in life but national in death’ (Financial Services Authority, 2009, p. 36). The money markets’ gratitude to their rescuers was, however, brief. Regardless of the fact that the high level of sovereign debt was, to a large extent, attributable to bank bailouts and their economic consequences, the financial markets soon resumed speculation against nation states, creating a growing ‘sovereign debt crisis’. The neoliberal economists’ response to high levels of public debt was to revive the ‘Treasury view’ that public sector deficits are economically damaging (Barro, 2009; Cochrane, 2009; Fama, 2009) and within 20 months of the emergency stimulus measures, this view came to dominate the public debate. But as Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein (2012, this issue) show, in the run-up to the crisis many prominent financial economists that had actively lent their academic prestige in support of deregulation and financialisation—and that now support austerity—had substantial undeclared conflicts of interest with the financial establishment. These conflicts of interest were so extensive, yet so rarely disclosed by the leading financial economists, that it would seem the norm is for financial economists to acquire financial affiliations. Parallel to its capturing of the academy, the financial industry’s money has co-opted much of the US political elite in both parties. As pointed out by Callinicos (2012, this issue), between 1999 and 2009 the financial industry spent $3.5 billion on lobbying and $2.2 billion on campaign donations. This does not, however, represent the high water mark of financial influence over politics and the nation state. The still evolving eurozone sovereign debt crisis has seen further and even more unsettling developments. In Greece, the elected head of state and in Italy, the entire cabinet were removed by international influence through a combination of pressures from larger European Union (EU) economies and the IMF. As Julian Coman (2011) observed: Democratic accountability has become a secondary virtue, desirable but expendable. In Italy and Greece, the former Goldman Sachs bankers, Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos, having been parachuted into highest political office, are set to raise retirement ages and cut state spending without having to canvas for a single vote … He went on to quote a senior EU official: We have seen democracies outstripped by the markets, which have forced decisions on elected governments. So that democratic freedom has been curtailed. How do you respond? Do you let that continue, or do you move towards stronger economic governance? And which is more legitimate, the rule of the markets or economic governance by representative institutions in which governments have a say? The continuing civil unrest in both countries suggests that there is a significant body of opinion opposed to the summary imposition of unelected ‘technocrats’ to push through packages of austerity measures and, unsurprisingly, there is much suspicion of these former bankers, who are seen to have contributed significantly to the development of the crisis in the first place. Whilst the task at hand is usually described as ‘bailing out sovereign states’ by the media, the uncomfortable reality is that it is, for the most part, the investors in sovereign bonds who are being bailed out. Whereas much has been written about fiscal profligacy and a lack of fiscal discipline in both Italy and Greece, this did not stop investors from purchasing large amounts of their sovereign debt, attracted by the higher returns on offer. This—and the subsequent market nervousness that pushed rates up to unaffordable levels—could, without too much difficulty, be regarded as behaviour reminiscent of that which produced the American subprime real-estate bubble. Further, like the debt resulting from that bubble, the austerity drive following the eurozone sovereign debt crisis effectively means that private risk has again been underwritten by the public sector. A strong case can be made that the turn to austerity only makes sense if it considered as part of the evolution of capitalism and the balance of class power within it—towards wealthy households, economically dominant firms (chief among them being financial firms), conservative politicians and right-wing populists. Since the comparative and historical economic evidence strongly supports the Keynesianism over the austerity is not as a response to It is far more as a class that to the state this Callinicos this and (2012, this issue) that in the UK the austerity a to the that characterised the UK during the into a neoliberal The of and the economic that drive it are most in the of and (2012, this issue) of the evolution of the political of the leading up to the financial made of neoliberal to not only and the markets in which dominant also it to the However, when the crisis a new government of and a came into power and the banks were to were in public but this was relatively less in other countries of a of the which to a in as the political elite in the to the of an international financial and of (2012, this issue) that the neoliberal has the of the financial crisis and resulting world and in so it has the of the current policy debate. The to which the world in the of the crisis, was in response to the financial markets’ increasingly towards high levels of sovereign was a in policy from stimulus to austerity. However, as is the case with markets, the had it into higher which in turn made debt increasingly further the markets’ nervousness and the speculative The or view gives to the of fiscal deficits as the to it is the markets and the of private on public sector spending as and The neoliberal policy as global and markets are increasingly to However, there are other in the has increasingly become the political and economic Since by its a in public spending and its effects are first by who on if the austerity package is not by significant to the of inequality. The view of the UK of the on austerity is that are all in this This is Whilst the of the that many in the UK have been the of the austerity is from and the mainstream media, there is a that the civil unrest is in part of a response to the and economic experienced by a growing of the and part have been as the by the of for in the current government The sense of at the of austerity in increasing has an increasingly in the The are a reaction to a recognition that economic problems are attributable to profligacy of the financial sector and and economic However, the it to a for their In the of this began to when in the of The for in both the share of and of the from the and The for and (2011) for the of a global for a global and strongly the of a the of to the (2011) that the in the has deeply and economic He went further to The at was seen by an large of as the of a and with the financial that of is still a sense or a for the and of of with a to as … It easy to do It is time to be more Whilst the financial sector has the for its it is the influence of the financial sector over the is relatively and it is to the and policy the burgeoning crisis is yet to new into political with only in international political and economic that their national national governments are a for global and finance. have been at the these have demonstrated an to to and to and that are most governments to this time is then there still be that solutions to the global financial and economic crisis be In the economic and political about neoliberal that government deficits are economically damaging like households, have to balance their do not, fiscal be on The that government to the private to and up interest further private spending is seen to be of since the government is not to and since governments are to money to the there are also fiscal on the that that public spending more private This is a fiscal policy is to raise of and interest which the of and in is to economic by and and by in the financial markets. In the historical provides evidence that austerity measures be in a of Whilst austerity have that the in the provides of the impact of (2012, this issue) that to austerity during a is that was austerity. to the current (2012, this issue) neoliberal the 2009 economic stimulus in the to interest rates and as as an government debt by the government interest in at and the the stimulus did not to a strong was of the of the financial crisis and resulting which to the collapse of wealth and the up of credit markets for Further, (2012, this issue) that over the in the fiscal has resulted in higher economic during the other of the of including (2012, this issue), that fiscal only and the to the be the is it is only then that efforts can This is as the of effects of government spending when the is significantly a of economic and to increasing to public and national debt as a of In the case of for (2012, this issue) that it was to its fiscal between and only as a of including in the international fiscal from the European Union and in public during a in can be to the national debt as increasing and and are as since the impact of a demand as a in government be at by the subsequent in government and The by (2012, this issue) that in the the retirement and all have However, the of financial retirement have the of American is its The of austerity is being in the As by and (2012, this issue), policy in the EU has been by the of the and which the of governments to to This is for countries economic with but which are into a single without fiscal and a to demand this (2012, this issue) that is with a in the European and an the historical in (2012, this issue) that the of the European by to that austerity and consumption are of the Since the of the has experienced in trade and resulting deficits in Greece, and the there has been a in aggregate demand in of resulting from fiscal policy and the slow in real rates to was by by the of in aggregate demand by in much of which was for by consumption by debt and the wealth of much the as consumption was in the in the of an part in the by in However, this balance is by the demand effects of when all countries are to cut demand and to to by labour and more further to that there is that can the in fiscal in and the are so different. Unlike these its It has of and at austerity can be to to further are to since that further austerity only the time, significant in and have the even less it was This is for of in Greece, since the from in the world the of international interest of which is is the if austerity is to (2012, this issue) there is much that be about the of government spending the from the out during the from to the significant to which the former of as a experienced and state In the former of and economic and increasing life that the most of the in the is government that the of the between national debt and economic it is to the UK’s since the on from the in UK national debt as a of from to the National debt as a of World War the UK national debt from of in to in In an to this the a fiscal policy that resulted in a for much of the so that the national In in a to the interest on the national debt, the government cut the of interest to This a and of new in the and of the the UK from the leading to a of and a on The impact of the resort to this in the was a significant to economic and a in the national debt from of in to by World War the national debt to of in and by to however, strong economic contributed to a in the national debt to of as the fiscal effects of and the in government spending with the of the with the of the National and the state. the 1970s and 1980s there was a from the and the of Keynesianism with in the 1970s and in the 1980s and the of debt to however, economic and a to public contributed to a in the national debt to of in But by it had again to of and by to of the level it had been during the 1970s. are that it rise to by The historical the of strong economic in the national In the fiscal of austerity are by the and consequences of the economic so the of public sector debt can be to rise In the about austerity it is to that the fiscal deficits are not a of increasing are a of the of packages to out financial emergency stimulus global in and public sector on and risk on the sovereign debt of the economic that the of austerity to as of economic are and is and and are debt over low interest is high and and consumption and are have their and seen an in for are to But without an in industry be to and low in most of the and are increasing it is a of and to and (2012, this issue) the of as a on and an to the to In the global is in a which can only be made by austerity. The 2008 financial crisis of the which was made and by the view that governments with a So are the by the that austerity is a response to the current A of the of the and the UK during the is In the the 1920s experienced p. described as an which was if was characterised by a in and and in new and This was by a in which can be seen as the of in however, in the US as the in spending and in the the stock market the had by and and were by and The of also a financial crisis and the collapse of a of In the the most package by democratic government the US was less and it was not the to by World War that the US In the UK followed a It remained in the the 1920s as the followed a monetary policy in support of the of the at its p. and a of the In however, there was policy including a cut in interest rates and The impact of these policies was to in the and of the and to economic growth. in both the and the UK following the the government a in the by that were in the UK by the of demand following World War this was characterised by and and this was considered of economic But with the rise of during the 1970s, the of economic and policy to the monetary of and the and with markets was a to the view that being a the for and with the and the Since policy has been by to by monetary means for increasing has been to market have been legal of labour and to more and has been with the of the labour market more Concurrently, other markets have been on the money have been large of the public sector have been and on the have been cut to The neoliberal has not been to but is also in the and policy from many in and governance and industry was the and policy were that was in of trade and as a in opposition to the public But as the of industry the to that large firms had a comparative in terms of in and in the stock the and of the that the stock market as an market for that on of shareholder this is despite the fact that in legal reality their has this the share price is as the of the as an economic and in so the of and finance. the 1970s, with the of the of in the stock market was by efforts to share by means capitalism of deregulation and as by which financial were to and the market of shares their real But when the reality was the collapse of stock market This leading including as at to its and to the and economic in which these were Since these financial market and the of have both the of and the at which financial market have the to be and development in made both the of and financial and their to investors the it also global markets to much more As a when in debt and other was their markets at to many of the financial institutions The was a up of collapse of and inability of financial institutions to a on their As stock market from the banking sector up and This on real a collapse in demand as and of the cut In the from the of to the of 2009 real by by and by the first of real remained its remained and was to these the UK of the banks and the in and the have the national debt by an billion between and In response to sovereign debt, the current among governments the world is it is to be over the by government the time of the bank bailouts the UK government had the with that the public money involved would be with a when the banks in were to the private sector. But that now a with the of the of which was taken into public at the of the financial crisis that a on this was to at a to the public of the significant contribution that the financial sector makes to the UK and US and the influence it since both the government and the banks have a interest in a to strong in the financial sector. So the banks have been to the bank even in banks that and were bailed out by public are also in their opposition to a on financial a for which have support from the As a the real of the bank bailouts is to on the of government and in the public sector. But it not The effects of this level of in public spending be substantial and and rates governments the world have that there is but to austerity and cut deficits in response to a burgeoning ‘sovereign debt crisis’. This is despite the which has demonstrated the with the current state of economic and political and the of the as being of growing economic which only be made by austerity But austerity is not the only The world faces deeply and the to in economic and a on fiscal at monetary be accompanied by policies at growth. in as and would be a to the current low rates of however, of do to an that has been towards and, in finance. Whilst much has been at the private sector for the reality is that from a are about As a to policy that This has the evolution of the between politics and since the 1970s. In to was for However, it to the speculation that to the the time has to of the from finance. with more of a much of a crisis in this is the of for to of to in This new of evolving new systems of governance and towards time The that have taken since the beginning of the 1970s be in the of or even governments. be task to and new be these of the global financial the in of speculative and the of to the of the are also however, to be with the and and their influence as a of in is in The as the a but all the are attracted by the lack of would be to move on financial of the The of regulatory a set of The current on the financial by the and American the of a and the of national The current financial crisis is the of the progressive of the banking sector following the from Keynesianism to during the 1970s. The evolution in monetary policy and in the banking sector that the of money became the for money demand became the became the banks in The by an of money and speculation by banks in to up the banks and head the burgeoning world by to the of and their But the to which these had their the banks of the problems governments in over their and financial support to governments that to be in measures were and countries were to balance their by public and The consequences of these measures have been the further of the and a growing opposition to which has the by governments between the of international and the of The resulting and the of nation has to by the and other financial which to the on the that elected governments in of unelected of with the banking the rights of money have over So is The problems in economies are deeply and resulting from of economic and their effects a and of both national economies and the global economic of which a We of the of the of for and on of this The
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The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties.
F. W. Paish, H. W. Arndt · Economica · 1945 · 117 citations