International Journal of Business and Management · 2014 · 11 citations · 24 references
BusinessAccountancyCorporate GovernanceAuditingCorporate FinanceShareholder RightsCorporate Governance MechanismsExternal AuditingFinancial Statement AuditsOwnership StructureExternal Audit QualityGovernance MechanismsOwnership Structure Effects
This paper provides empirical evidence on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and thechoice of high-quality and low-quality auditors (hereafter “auditor choice”) based on firm’s data from Chineselisted firms between 2007 and 2012. Consistent with most literature, this paper adopts Big 4 auditors as theproxy for high-audit quality. Our findings indicate that certain corporate governance factors, ownership of thelargest shareholders, the aggregate of ownership of other large shareholders, percentage of independent directorsin the board, dual-list status and marketization, have significant positive influence on auditor choice. Morespecifically, ownership of the largest shareholders exhibits a U-shape relationship for the auditor choice: in thelower ownership, a Chinese listed firm would prefer a low-quality auditor, while up to the threshold level ofownership, a Chinese listed firm would prefer a high-quality auditor. This paper also explains several possiblereasons why Big 4 auditors are still uncommon in Chinese stock market.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · The Journal of Finance · 2002 · 4.2K citations · Full text
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, James Lin · The Journal of Finance · 2000 · 2.5K citations