Security and Communication Networks · 2013 · 45 citations · 18 references
ComputingComputer ScienceComputer SecurityCryptographySecurity ArchitectureInformation-theoretic SecuritySecret SharingDiscrete Logarithm ProblemLagrange ElementsMulti-secret SharingSecret ReconstructionSecret Sharing SchemesShamir's Secret Sharing
ABSTRACT In Shamir's ( t , n ) secret sharing (SS) scheme, the secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer and is shared among n shareholders in such a way that any t or more than t shares can reconstruct this secret; but fewer than t shares cannot obtain any information about the secret s . In this paper, we will introduce the security problem that an adversary can obtain the secret when there are more than t participants in Shamir's secret reconstruction. A secure secret reconstruction scheme , which prevents the adversary from obtaining the secret is proposed. In our scheme, Lagrange components , which are linear combination of shares, are used to reconstruct the secret. Lagrange component can protect shares unconditionally. We show that this scheme can be extended to design a multi‐secret sharing scheme. All existing multi‐secret sharing schemes are based on some cryptographic assumptions, such as a secure one‐way function or solving the discrete logarithm problem; but, our proposed multi‐secret sharing scheme is unconditionally secure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Adi Shamir · Communications of the ACM · 1979 · 13.5K citations · Full text
A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing
Paul Feldman · 1987 · 1.1K citations
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
Benny Chor, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali et al. · 1985 · 770 citations
How to share a secret with cheaters
Martin Tompa, Heather Woll · Journal of Cryptology · 1989 · 391 citations · Full text