AIChE Journal · 2005 · 87 citations · 6 references
Natural ResourcesEconomicsPetroleum EngineeringEnergy EconomicsEnergy PolicyResource ScarcityCommodity Price DynamicsOil EconomicsCrude Oil MarketsOil DemandOil Price VolatilityOil PricesOil Production EconomicsOil Supply DisruptionPeak Oil
Oil is the lifeblood of modern civilization. It fuels the vast majority of the world's mechanized transportation equipment — automobiles, trucks, airplanes, trains, ships, farm equipment, etc. Oil is also the primary feedstock for many of the chemicals that are essential to modern life. The demand for oil continues to increase with time, and at some time, conventional oil supply will no longer be capable of satisfying world demand. At that point world conventional oil production will have peaked. The peaking of world oil production presents the world with an unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, without timely mitigation liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. Indeed, the rapid rise in world oil prices in the 2004-5 period may likely appear modest in comparison to the price escalations and oil shortages that are almost certain to accompany the peaking of world conventional oil production. The peaking of world oil production could create enormous economic disruption, as only glimpsed during the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 Iranian oil cut-off. There are a significant and growing number of peaking studies and forecasts in the open literature. However, since much of the relevant oil reserves data is shrouded in secrecy, oil peaking forecasting is far from being definitive. Against this background, we focus on mitigation of oil peaking without selecting a date for that occurrence. We consider three scenarios in order to estimate the time required for implementation of effective worldwide mitigation strategies. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have substantial impact on a world scale, but we argue that they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking. Oil is typically found in underground reservoirs of dramatically different sizes, at varying depths, and with widely varying characteristics. The largest oil reservoirs are called “Super Giants,” many of which were discovered in the Middle East. Because of their size and other characteristics, super giant reservoirs are generally the easiest to find, the most economic to develop, and the longest lived. The last super giant oil reservoirs were found in 1967 and 1968. Since then, smaller reservoirs of varying sizes have been discovered in what are called “oil prone” locations worldwide — oil is not found everywhere. Geologists understand that oil is a finite resource in the earth's crust, and at some future date, world oil production will reach a peak, after which production will decline. This logic follows from the well-established behavior that the output of individual oil fields rises after discovery, reaches a peak and declines thereafter. It is important to recognize that oil production peaking is not the same as “running out.” Peaking is an oil field's maximum oil production rate, which typically occurs after roughly half of the recoverable oil in the field has been produced. In many ways, what is likely to happen on a world scale is similar to what happens to individual oil fields, because world production is the sum total of production from thousands of oil fields. Once oil has been discovered via an exploratory well, full-scale production requires many more wells across the reservoir to provide multiple paths that facilitate the flow of oil to the surface. The total recoverable oil in a reservoir is its so-called “reserves.” The concept of reserves is generally not well understood. “Reserves” is an estimate of the amount of oil in an oil field that can be extracted at an assumed cost. Thus, a higher oil price outlook often means that more oil can be produced, but geology places an upper limit on price-dependent reserves growth; in well managed oil fields, it is often 10 – 20% more than what is available at lower prices. Specialists who estimate reserves use an array of methodologies and a great deal of judgment. Thus, different estimators might calculate different reserves from the same data. Sometimes politics or self-interest influences reserves estimates, e.g., an oil reservoir owner may want a higher estimate in order to attract outside investment or to influence other producers. Reserves and production should not be confused. An oil field can have large estimated reserves, but if the field is past its maximum production, the remaining reserves can only be produced at a declining rate. World oil demand is expected to grow more than 40% by 2025.2 Since oil production from individual oil fields grows to a peak and then declines, new oil fields must be continually discovered and brought into production to compensate for the depletion of older ones and to provide the increases demanded by the market. When world oil production peaks, there will still be large reserves remaining. Peaking means that the rate of world oil production cannot increase, and that production will thereafter decrease with time. Past predictions typically forecast peaking in the succeeding 10 – 20 year period. Most such predictions were wrong. Recently, many credible analysts have become much more pessimistic about the possibility of finding the huge new reserves needed to meet growing world demand. Even many of the optimistic forecasts suggest that world oil peaking will occur in less than 25 years. Extensive exploration has occurred worldwide for the last 30 years, but results have been disappointing. If recent trends hold, there is little reason to expect that exploration success will dramatically improve in the future. This situation is evident in Figure 1, which shows the difference between annual world oil reserves additions minus annual consumption.3 The image is one of a world moving from a long period in which reserve additions were much greater than consumption, to an era in which annual additions are falling increasingly below annual consumption. Difference between annual world oil reserves additions and annual consumption—1940–2000. Various individuals and groups have used available information and geological estimates to develop projections for when world oil production might peak. A sampling of recent projections is shown in Table 1. Disruptions ranged in duration from one to 44 months. Percentage supply shortfalls varied from roughly one percent to nearly 14% of world production. The most traumatic disruption, 1973-74, was not the most severe, but it nevertheless lead to greatly increased oil prices and significant worldwide economic damage. The second most traumatic disruption, 1979, was also neither the longest or the most severe. The 1973-74 and 1979 disruptions are the most relevant to what might happen at world oil peaking, but both were relatively short-lived because additional production capacity was available in OPEC. That will not be the case with world oil peaking, and higher oil prices will result. Higher oil prices result in increased costs for the production and delivery of goods and services. High prices can also impact inflation and unemployment, reduce demand for products other than oil, and reduce the capital available for investment. Tax revenues can decline and budget deficits increase, driving up interest rates. These effects will be greater the more abrupt and severe an oil price increase, and will be exacerbated by the impact on consumer and business confidence. Without timely mitigation, the long-run impact on the developed economies will almost certainly be extremely damaging, while many developing nations will likely be much worse off. Practical mitigation of the problems associated with world oil peaking must include fuel efficiency technologies that will have a large scale impact over time. It is clear that automobiles and light trucks (light duty vehicles or LDVs) represent the largest targets for consumption reduction worldwide. Government-mandated vehicle fuel efficiency requirements are certain to be an element in the mitigation of world oil peaking. In addition to major fuel efficiency improvements in conventional vehicles, one result would almost certainly be the more rapid deployment of diesel and hybrid power trains. Market penetration of these technologies cannot happen rapidly, because of the time and effort required for manufacturers to retool their factories for large-scale production and because of the slow turnover of existing vehicles. In addition, a shift from gasoline to diesel fuel would require a major refitting of refineries, which will take time. It is difficult to project what the fuel economy benefits of hybrid or diesel LDVs might be on an international scale, because consumer preferences will likely change once the public understands the potential impacts of the peaking of world oil production. The fuel efficiency benefits that hybrids might provide for heavy-duty trucks and buses are likely less than for LDVs for a number of reasons, including the fact that there has long been a commercial demand for higher efficiency technologies in order to minimize fuel costs for these fleets. Improved oil recovery (IOR) is used to varying degrees in almost all oil fields worldwide. An important opportunity to increase production from existing oil fields is the use of enhanced oil recovery technology (EOR), also known as tertiary recovery. EOR is usually initiated after primary and secondary recovery have provided most of what they can provide. Primary production is the process by which oil naturally flows to the surface because oil is under pressure underground. Secondary recovery involves the injection of water into a reservoir to force additional oil to the surface. EOR has been practiced since the 1950s in various conventional oil fields, primarily in the United States of America. The process that likely has the largest worldwide potential is miscible flooding, wherein carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen or light hydrocarbons are injected into oil reservoirs, where they act as solvents and/or pressures to move residual oil. Of the three options, CO2 flooding has proven to be the most frequently useful. This category of unconventional oil includes a variety of viscous oils: Heavy oil, bitumen, oil sands, and tar sands. These oils have potential to play a much larger role in satisfying the world's needs for liquid fuels in the future. The largest deposits of these oils exist in Canada and Venezuela, with smaller resources in Russia, Europe and the U.S. While the size of the Canadian and Venezuela resources are enormous, 3-4 trillion barrels in total, the amount of oil estimated to be economically recoverable is of the order of 600 billion barrels. 1This relatively low fraction is in large part due to the extremely difficult task of extracting these oils.29 The reasons why the production of unconventional oils has not been more extensive is as follows: (1) Production costs for unconventional oils are typically much higher than for conventional oil; (2) significant quantities of energy are required to recover and transport unconventional oils; (3) unconventional oils are of lower quality and, therefore, are more expensive to refine into clean transportation fuels than conventional oils, and (4) there are severe environmental problems associated with the production of these unconventional oils, including increased production of greenhouse gases. Very large reservoirs of natural gas exist around the world, many in locations isolated from gas-consuming markets. Significant quantities of this “stranded gas” have been liquefied and transported to various markets in refrigerated, pressurized ships in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Another method of bringing stranded natural gas to world markets is to convert the methane to high quality liquid fuels using the Fisher-Tropsch (F-T) process. As with coal liquefaction, F-T based GTL results in clean fuels, ready for use in existing end-use equipment with only modest finishing and blending. This gas-to-liquids process has undergone significant development over the past decade. To derive liquid fuels from coal, the leading process involves gasification of the coal, removal of impurities from the resultant gas, and then synthesis of liquid fuels using the Fisher-Tropsch process. Modern gasification technologies have been dramatically improved over the years, with the result that over 150 gasifiers are in commercial operation around the world, a number operating on coal. Gas cleanup technologies are well developed and utilized in refineries worldwide. F-T synthesis is also well developed and commercially practiced. A number of coal liquefaction plants were built and operated during World War II, and the Sasol Company subsequently built a number of larger, more modern facilities in South Africa.10 Coal liquids from gasification/F-T synthesis are of such high quality that they do not need to be refined. When co-producing electricity, coal liquefaction is believed capable of providing clean substitute fuels at $30 – 35 per barrel.11 Biomass can be grown, collected and converted to substitute liquid fuels by a number of processes. Currently, biomass-to-ethanol is produced on a large scale to provide a gasoline additive in the U.S. and Brazil among other places. The market for ethanol derived from biomass is influenced by government requirements and facilitated by generous tax subsidies. Research holds promise of more economical ethanol production from cellulosic (“woody”) biomass, but these processes are far from economic. Reducing the cost of growing, harvesting, transporting, and converting biomass crops will be necessary.12 Recently, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) completed a study that included an evaluation of the technical, economic and societal challenges associated with the development of a hydrogen economy.13 The study concluded that fuel cells must improve by (1) a factor of 10-20 in cost, (2) a factor of five in lifetime, and (3) roughly a factor of two in efficiency. The NRC did not believe that such improvements could be achieved by development of current technologies alone; instead, new concepts (breakthroughs) will be required. In other words, today's technologies do not appear practically viable, and the time scale, or even if there will be an introduction of commercial hydrogen vehicles cannot be predicted. Scenario I assumed that action is not initiated until peaking occurs. Scenario II assumed that action is initiated 10 years before peaking. Scenario III assumed action is initiated 20 years before peaking. The analysis was simplified to provide transparency and promote understanding. While estimates were approximate, the mitigation envelope that resulted is believed to be indicative of the realities of such an enormous undertaking. The focus was on large-scale, physical mitigation, as opposed to analysis of policy actions, e.g., tax credits, rationing, automobile speed restrictions, etc. Physical mitigation included (1) implementation of technologies that can substantially reduce the consumption of liquid fuels (improved fuel efficiency) while still delivering comparable service, and (2) the construction and operation of facilities that yield large quantities of liquid fuels. The pace that governments and industry choose to mitigate the impacts of the peaking of world oil production is not knowable in advance. As a limiting case, our analysis assumed overnight go-ahead decision-making for all actions, that is, crash programs mandated by governments worldwide. This is obviously the most optimistic situation because government and corporate decision-making is rarely instantaneous. The model chosen to illustrate the possible effects of likely mitigation actions involves the use of to the scale and pace of are of two The is the time needed to market In the case of this is the time required to vehicles and retool factories to more vehicles. In the case of the production of substitute fuels, the is associated with and construction of relevant The second part of the the growing of fuel or enhanced and substitute fuel production. The must liquid fuels that as produced or as substitute for liquid fuels in etc. The products be with existing and end-use this Because there are huge of light duty and heavy-duty vehicles, trains, ships, and other equipment with of – 30 years that must be and cannot be The must be capable of liquid fuels or production on a scale — to of of barrels per worldwide. The must include technology that is commercial or which at a requires that the process has been on a large fuel production technologies must be energy assumed to that greater than of process energy is in the clean liquid fuels or energy efficiency technologies that or were not of interest in this because commercial processes to convert to clean fuels do not In the end-use efficiency a increase in the efficiency of fuel equipment is one The of corporate fuel economy requirements for automobiles in was one of the most effective of the initiated in to the oil A more will be an essential element in peak oil oil recovery is in commercial use and is worldwide. Heavy is commercial in Canada and Coal liquefaction is a is commercially where the natural gas is from markets. A number of options were for various oil can be into substitute liquid fuels, but the technology to that task is not ready for deployment and commercial scale oil plants do not Biomass options capable of liquid fuels were also not from is biomass utilized in the and transportation primarily because it is mandated and/or fuel is a of current but it is not commercially A major effort might change the biomass but only if initiated in the future. of world oil consumption is for from of liquid fuels is likely to that have in recent in the U.S. and The time for such is significant world scale large substitute energy facilities would have to be and that would require time and which is not a substitute fuel in transportation equipment that requires liquid fuels. In the future after oil peaking, it is that a shift from liquid fuels to might occur in some However, of such would be at this time. It is not possible to with when world conventional oil peaking will occur or production will decline after the peak. our analysis did not a date for peaking. peaking was assumed at year and the analysis effects of mitigation from 20 years before to 20 years after peaking. A for world oil peaking was also and the of the production was used because oil production what in a oil over the of over five our world production at peaking was as which is the current world production. If peaking were to occur in the year or the would be if peaking occurs at at some future date, the would be Since were estimates, a peak a credible for this of The of is not as a of or its use is for Another important is future world oil demand The World Council demand is to increase at about per year from about in to in — an increase of about trends a percent per year world oil demand in part by oil consumption in and However, a percent rate on a this a two percent long-run economy demand after peaking was This of demand after peaking a that of supply This has the of but it the of oil price on which is to happen but will be extremely difficult to It should be that some analysts have world oil production decline of – well the assumed in our higher decline would the mitigation much more until world oil production before crash action the world with a significant liquid fuel for more than two a mitigation crash 10 years before world oil peaking but still a liquid fuels roughly a decade after the time that oil would have peaked. a mitigation crash 20 years before peaking the possibility of a world liquid fuels for the forecast period. The from this analysis is that with timely mitigation, the worldwide economic costs of peaking can be If mitigation were to be little and/or the world will be achieved demand which would to significant economic worldwide. the one mitigation initiated would be if peaking is still the other if peaking is to mitigation will have significant economic and costs to the and the The world has a and the to act on a timely is almost certain to have major requires the implementation of mitigation well to peaking. Since it is when peaking will the is the past world economic development has been by the of oil. energy to coal, coal to oil, were and as a result of the and efficiency of the new not the of of the fuel being In oil peaking will be abrupt and and result in shortages and economic The world has a Without mitigation at a decade before the the will be and long Oil peaking a liquid fuels not an in the that has often been mitigation of declining world oil production must be at in the A number of technologies are available for implementation once there is the to worldwide will have to take the on a timely and it may be to economic, social, and political or that will from because in there are for that act In we that of the crash programs may not be because the worldwide and do not In addition, the for investment from the will likely be We to provide more estimates of such crash programs might be practically in light of existing worldwide
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Oil Shocks and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Price Variability*
Kiseok Lee, Shawn Ni, Ronald A. Ratti · The Energy Journal · 1995 · 930 citations