Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption

TLDR

Distributed systems require attribute‑based access control, but current approaches rely on a trusted server whose compromise endangers data confidentiality, making our method conceptually closer to traditional role‑based access control. This paper introduces ciphertext‑policy attribute‑based encryption to enforce complex access control on encrypted data. The scheme lets attributes describe user credentials, lets the encryptor set the access policy, and we provide an implementation with performance measurements. Encrypted data remain confidential even when the storage server is untrusted, and the scheme resists collusion attacks.

Abstract

In several distributed systems a user should only be able to access data if a user posses a certain set of credentials or attributes. Currently, the only method for enforcing such policies is to employ a trusted server to store the data and mediate access control. However, if any server storing the data is compromised, then the confidentiality of the data will be compromised. In this paper we present a system for realizing complex access control on encrypted data that we call ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. By using our techniques encrypted data can be kept confidential even if the storage server is untrusted; moreover, our methods are secure against collusion attacks. Previous attribute-based encryption systems used attributes to describe the encrypted data and built policies into user's keys; while in our system attributes are used to describe a user's credentials, and a party encrypting data determines a policy for who can decrypt. Thus, our methods are conceptually closer to traditional access control methods such as role-based access control (RBAC). In addition, we provide an implementation of our system and give performance measurements.