Resurrecting the tracking theories

Fred Adams, Murray Clarke

Australasian Journal of Philosophy · 2005 · 82 citations · 12 references

Concepts

Abstract

Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial. Historical Prelude Tracking theories 1 of knowledge, though quite popular among naturalists, cognitive scientists, and other scientifically-minded philosophers, have been under attack almost from their inception. Specifically, we have in mind the attacks of Pappas and Swain, Ray Martin, Saul Kripke, Laurence Bonjour, and Keith DeRose. 2 We don’t think any of these attacks on tracking theories work. In this paper, we intend to take a step towards resurrecting the tracking theories of knowledge. We will not be able to focus attention on

References

12