Management Science · 2006 · 163 citations · 27 references
BusinessDecision SciencesEconomicsDecision TheoryKidney TransplantationQueuing TheoryDiscrete Choice ModelsOrgan AllocationOrgan ProcurementQueueing TheoryRecipient SelectionTransplant AllocationEfficiency-equity TradeoffEquity Efficiency Trade-offsEquity-efficiency Trade-offKidney Allocation SystemsQueuesTrade-off Between EfficiencyTruthful Mechanism DesignUtility-based Allocation
In kidney allocation, candidates privately know their likelihood of good post‑transplant outcomes or quality‑of‑life gains, creating information asymmetry. The paper builds a mechanism‑design model to study how this asymmetry affects kidney allocation. The model features n candidate‑type queues, with candidates strategically reporting their type to join a queue; kidneys of heterogeneous types are assigned to queues, and candidate utility depends on kidney type and waiting time (computed via fluid approximations); the allocation problem is solved explicitly for both aggregate‑utility and minimum‑utility welfare objectives. The mechanism induces truth‑telling by giving longer‑waiting candidates better kidneys, generates information rents for high‑risk candidates under efficiency and low‑risk candidates under equity, and a choice‑based allocation yields outcomes between the two extremes.
In kidney allocation, transplant candidates may have private information about their propensity to enjoy good outcomes after transplantation or about their relative expected improvement in quality of life after transplantation. This paper develops a mechanism design model to investigate the effect of such information asymmetry on the kidney allocation system. In this model, there are n transplant queues corresponding to n candidate types. Candidate types are only observed by the candidates, and each candidate chooses the queue to join by reporting a type. Kidneys have heterogeneous types, and each kidney will be assigned to one of the queues depending on its type. Candidates report their type strategically to join the queue that maximizes their utility. Candidate utility depends on the type of kidney received and the expected waiting time, which is calculated using fluid approximations. We consider two alternative social welfare functions: aggregate utility (emphasizing efficiency) and minimum utility across all candidates (emphasizing equity). The kidney allocation problem is to divide the organ supply among the different queues so that social welfare is maximized, and this problem is solved explicitly under both objective functions. There are three findings: (1) The allocation mechanism induces truth telling by ensuring that candidates who wait longer receive better kidneys; (2) Information rents are earned by high-risk candidates under the efficiency objective and by low-risk candidates under the equity objective; (3) a choice-based kidney allocation system in which candidates choose the type of queue to join leads to outcomes in the middle of the efficiency-equity spectrum.
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Theodore Groves · Econometrica · 1973 · 3.3K citations
Management, Organization Studies, Organizational Behavior +17
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Eric Maskin, John G. Riley · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1984 · 1.2K citations
United Network for Organ Sharing
Clifford Goodman · 1988 · 744 citations
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2004 · 638 citations · Full text
Medicine, Economics, Auction Theory +13