A Continuous Strategy Game for Power Transactions Analysis in Competitive Electricity Markets

J. B. Park, B. H. Kim, J. H. Kim, Manho Joung, Jaesuk Park

IEEE Power Engineering Review · 2001 · 76 citations · 9 references

Concepts

Abstract

This article presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where participants, especially generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this article, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a noncooperative game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea. In order to provide more apprehensible analysis, we suggest a new hybrid solution approach employing a two-dimensional graphical approach as well as an analytical method. Finally, the proposed approach is demonstrated on a sample power system.

References

9