Beyond Concepts: Ontology as Reality Representation

Barry Smith

2004 · 233 citations · 10 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Ontological engineering traditionally assumes that concepts are the subject matter of ontology, yet the term is ill‑defined and concepts are viewed as products of human cognition. The essay argues that ontologies for natural‑science research should represent universals and particulars in reality, not concepts. The authors outline a method that shows how this reality‑based view yields rigorous formal definitions of foundational relations in influential ontologies, using life‑science examples. The approach produces rigorous formal definitions of foundational relations in influential ontologies, as demonstrated by life‑science examples.

Abstract

There is an assumption commonly embraced by ontological engineers, an assumption which has its roots in the discipline of knowledge representation, to the effect that it is concepts which form the subject-matter of ontology. The term 'con- cept' is hereby rarely precisely defined, and the intended role of concepts within on- tology is itself subject to a variety of conflicting (and sometimes intrinsically inco- herent) interpretations. It seems, however, to be widely accepted that concepts are in some sense the products of human cognition. The present essay is devoted to the application of ontology in support of research in the natural sciences. It defends the thesis that ontologies de- veloped for such purposes should be understood as having as their subject matter, not concepts, but rather the universals and particulars which exist in reality and are captured in scientific laws. We outline the benefits of a view along these lines by showing how it yields rigorous formal definitions of the foundational relations used in many influential ontologies, illustrating our results by reference to examples drawn from the domain of the life sciences.

References

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