Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit

Thomas P. Lyon, John W. Maxwell

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2006 · 271 citations · 26 references

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Concepts

TL;DR

We develop an economic model of greenwash in which firms strategically disclose environmental information while activists may audit and penalize selective positive reporting. The model fully characterizes equilibria and derives predictions about disclosure behavior. It predicts a nonmonotonic link between expected environmental performance and disclosure, shows that stronger activist pressure reduces greenwashing yet can prompt some firms to disclose less, and indicates that environmental management systems deter poor performers from greenwashing, supporting policies that promote their adoption.

Abstract

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.

References

26