Journal of Economic Studies · 2000 · 37 citations · 52 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryCapital StructureCorporate FinanceAgency CostsBoard GovernanceBoard StructureCorporate Governance MechanismsFamily OwnershipOwnership StructureAgency Cost TheoryBoard Insider ControlCorporate Ownership StructureDebt-to-asset RatioFamily ShareholdingOwnership Structure Effects
Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.
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