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Democracy and Education Spending in Africa
661
Citations
38
References
2005
Year
Development EconomicsAfrican Public PolicyEducationPanel DataAfrican Education SystemsEconomic InstitutionsSocial SciencesPublic SpendingDemocracyPolitical EconomyBasic Service ProvisionAfrican DevelopmentPublic PolicyEconomicsPublic ExpenditureEducational DistrictingAfrican PoliticsEducation SpendingPublic EducationPolitical CompetitionPublic EconomicsBusinessEducation PolicyPolitical ScienceEducation Economics
Electoral competition is thought to shape public spending, yet little work has examined how recent democratization in the developing world, especially in the poorest countries with weak institutions, has altered basic service provision. This study directly tests whether the transition to multiparty competition in African nations has led to increased spending on primary education. Using a game‑theoretic model, the authors argue that the pursuit of an electoral majority motivates governments to allocate more resources to education, favoring primary schools over universities, and they evaluate three propositions from this model with panel data on electoral competition and education spending. The analysis finds that democratically elected African governments spend more on primary education, while university spending remains unchanged.
While it is widely believed that electoral competition influences public spending decisions, there has been relatively little effort to examine how recent democratization in the developing world has resulted in changes in basic service provision. There have been even fewer attempts to investigate whether democracy matters for public spending in the poorest developing countries, where “weak institutions” may mean that the formal adoption of electoral competition has little effect on policy. In this article I confront these questions directly, asking whether the shift to multiparty competition in African countries has resulted in increased spending on primary education. I develop an argument, illustrated with a game‐theoretic model, which suggests that the need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted African governments to spend more on education and to prioritize primary schools over universities within the education budget. I test three propositions from the model using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in African countries. I find clear evidence that democratically elected African governments have spent more on primary education, while spending on universities appears unaffected by democratization .
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