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Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical Relativism
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0
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1978
Year
Historical RelativismPhilosophy Of HistoryPositivismAnalytic PhilosophySocial SciencesPhilosophy Of ActionHistory Of ScienceAbsolute RealismLanguage StudiesAp ProachLogical NecessityPhilosophy Of PhysicInterdisciplinary StudiesPhilosophy (Philosophy Of Mind)Philosophy (French Literary Studies)Speculative PhilosophyPhilosophy Of ReasonNatural SciencesEpistemologyHistorical ReassessmentAnthropology
Philosophers, anthropologists and historians tend to view themselves and their colleagues as either realists or as relativists. The thesis of this paper is that this distinction is not a logical necessity but a historical situation in western scientific culture. It is claimed here that the distinction is spurious: every problem has a realist and a relativist dimension, and the two views can be, and are actually be ing, held simultaneously. Once a frame of reference has been selected, in it realism prevails. With respect to selection of an appropriate framework the ap proach has to be relativist since there is no absolute, external-to-all framework which would fit absolute realism. It is also shown that well-known philosophers of science actually are two-tier-thinkers — that is, they have simultaneously held relativist and realist views.