Chiefs as Critical Partners for Decentralized Governance of Fisheries: An Analysis of Co-Management Case Studies in Malawi

Abstract

Centralized regulation and fisheries co-management institutions, when imposed on Malawian fisherfolk, have failed due to poor local legitimacy, resulting in de facto open access regimes for most Malawian fisheries. Case studies from a range of locations indicate that a key to success or failure in co-management lies in understanding the roles played by both traditional (chiefs) and representational (stakeholder) institutions. Formally instituted, conservation-driven co-management institutions are unlikely to be effective if they try to replace informally derived, consensus-based social and cultural institutions. Additionally, institutional legitimacy requires downward accountability, and both traditional and decentralized institutions must remain vigilant against the threat of elite capture. An analysis of fisherfolk and chieftain roles in Malawi's fisheries management regimes illustrates how these stakeholders may either promote or undermine socially and ecologically sustainable outcomes. We conclude that both decentralized representational institutions and “institutional bricolage” facilitated by chiefs are critical to maintaining resilient co-management institutions and fishing livelihoods.