Publication | Closed Access
Self-Serving Justifications
404
Citations
33
References
2015
Year
Moral ReasoningBehavioral SciencesPrompt PeopleProsocial BehaviorMoral NormsUnethical BehaviorSocial PsychologyPsychologyMoral IssueNormative EthicSocial SciencesApplied Social PsychologyIntentional Unethical BehaviorMoral Psychology
Unethical behavior by ordinary people poses significant societal and personal challenges. The study introduces a framework that uses self‑serving justifications to explain how individuals who see themselves as moral can commit unethical acts while maintaining a moral self‑image. Pre‑violation justifications reframe questionable actions as excusable, reducing anticipated moral threat, while post‑violation justifications provide compensatory narratives that lessen experienced moral threat. The framework identifies these pre‑ and post‑violation justifications as key psychological mechanisms enabling moral self‑preservation during unethical acts, and points to future research on their temporal dynamics.
Unethical behavior by “ordinary” people poses significant societal and personal challenges. We present a novel framework centered on the role of self-serving justification to build upon and advance the rapidly expanding research on intentional unethical behavior of people who value their morality highly. We propose that self-serving justifications emerging before and after people engage in intentional ethical violations mitigate the threat to the moral self, enabling them to do wrong while feeling moral. Pre-violation justifications lessen the anticipated threat to the moral self by redefining questionable behaviors as excusable. Post-violation justifications alleviate the experienced threat to the moral self through compensations that balance or lessen violations. We highlight the psychological mechanisms that prompt people to do wrong and feel moral, and suggest future research directions regarding the temporal dimension of self-serving justifications of ethical misconduct.
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