American Economic Journal Economic Policy · 2009 · 353 citations · 38 references
Public AffairsEconomicsPublic FinancePublic EconomicsTax AvoidanceTaxationBehavioral Responses To TaxationEconomic LossIndirect CostsOptimal TaxationTax EvasionWelfare EconomicsDeadweight Loss Of TaxationEffective Marginal Tax RatesEfficiency Costs Of TaxationHigh-net-worth IndividualsMarginal Effective Tax RatesMarginal Excess BurdenMarginal Resource CostTaxation Of High-income Earners
Feldstein’s 1999 taxable‑income formula for deadweight loss assumes the marginal social cost of evasion and avoidance equals the tax rate, an assumption likely violated because some costs are transfers to others and some individuals overestimate those costs. In such cases, excess burden depends on a weighted average of taxable‑income and total‑earned‑income elasticities, with the weight set by the resource cost of sheltering income from taxation. The generalized formula shows that taxing high‑income individuals may not impose a large efficiency cost even though their reported incomes are highly sensitive to marginal tax rates. JEL codes: H21, H24, H26.
Martin Feldstein's (1999) widely used taxable income formula for deadweight loss assumes the marginal social cost of evasion and avoidance equals the tax rate. This condition is likely to be violated in practice for two reasons. First, some of the costs of evasion and avoidance are transfers to other agents. Second, some individuals overestimate the costs of evasion and avoidance. In such situations, excess burden depends on a weighted average of the taxable income and total earned income elasticities, with the weight determined by the resource cost of sheltering income from taxation. This generalized formula implies the efficiency cost of taxing high income individuals is not necessarily large despite evidence that their reported incomes are highly sensitive to marginal tax rates. (JEL H21, H24, H26)
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