Managing fisheries is managing people: what has been learned?

Ray Hilborn

Fish and Fisheries · 2007 · 308 citations · 44 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Understanding fishermen behavior and fleet dynamics is essential for fisheries management, and incentive systems can reduce race‑for‑fish, improve profitability, rebuild stocks, reduce bycatch, and curb illegal fishing, yet success is rarely evaluated beyond percent overfished. The study aims to identify effective incentive structures by learning from successful cases and calls for systematic evaluation of multiple performance dimensions beyond percent overfished. The author compares yield losses from overfishing across ecosystems, contrasting high losses in North Atlantic cod with low losses in New Zealand and the U.S. west coast.

Abstract

Abstract Understanding the behaviour of fishermen is a key ingredient to successful fisheries management. The aggregate behaviour of fishing fleets can be predicted and managed with appropriate incentives. To determine appropriate incentives, we should look to successes to learn what works and what does not. In different fisheries incentive systems have been found to reduce the race‐for‐fish and make fisheries profitable, to stimulate stock rebuilding, to reduce bycatch, and to provide for reductions in illegal fishing. Yet, success can be evaluated in many dimensions, but is, in fact, rarely done – per cent overfished seems to be the dominant measure of performance. I evaluate the yield lost due to overfishing in several ecosystems and contrast the situation of North Atlantic cod where considerable yield is lost, to fisheries in New Zealand and the west coast of the USA where lost yield due to overfishing is very small. Much more systematic evaluation of the other aspects of fisheries performance is greatly needed. From examples explored in this paper I conclude that prevention of overfishing can be achieved with strong central governments enforcing conservative catch regulations, but economic success appears to require an appropriate incentive structure.

References

44