Sharing Regional Cooperative Gains From Reusing Effluent for Irrigation

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the allocation of cost and benefits from regional cooperation, with respect to reuse of municipal effluent for irrigation at the Ramla region of Israel. An efficient regional solution provides the maximal regional income which has to be redistributed among the town and several farms. Different allocations based on marginal cost pricing and schemes from cooperative game theory like the core, Shapley value, generalized Shapley value, and nucleolus are applied. The town and farm A have the main additional gains according to all allocation schemes presented. Advantages and disadvantages of these allocation schemes are examined in order to suggest a fair and acceptable allocation of the regional cooperative gains. Although no method has been preferred, the marginal cost pricing was found to be unacceptable by the participants. The conclusion is that the theory of cooperative games may provide guidelines while comparing the different solutions.