The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia

Abstract

Though the West welcomed Boris Yeltsin's reelection as president of Russia, Russia's cooperation with, let alone integration into, the West cannot be taken for granted. Yeltsin faces poor health, a parliament still dominated by communists and other opponents of democracy, and a war of secession in Chechnya. Moreover, Yeltsin's own behavior has been erratic. In particular he has shown a willingness to compromise with nationalist and less-than-liberal politicians, including his former national security aid, Alexander Lebed. Given Russia's power and importance, this article addresses the sources of Russia's recent and future conduct. It approaches this task by answering two questions. First, how do Russian political leaders perceive the still new international order in which they find themselves? This question is important, because by knowing the theories of international politics that different leaders hold and their relative influence in policy we can predict (albeit imperfectly) how states will behave in the future. Second, what are the sources of those theories? The origin of the current Russian foreign-policy elite's theories of international relations is intriguing, not only because it can contribute to our understanding of theory formation and development, but because it holds implications for our understanding of international relations in general. Identification of the source or sources of policy makers' thinking about foreign affairs at the very least guides observers interested in explaining and predicting state behavior.' More ambi-