John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy

Abstract

A quick perusal of the contents of this book reveals that the title John Locke and Personal Identity is slightly misleading.There are six chapters in total, and Locke's theory of personal identity is the subject of only two of them, chapters 1 and 6.Each of the four chapters in between is devoted to one of Locke's contemporaries -Descartes, Hobbes, More and Boyle -or more particularly, to their views on the immortality of the soul and/or bodily resurrection.Forstrom argues that not only do these views form the context for Locke's development of his theory of personal identity, but also (and more importantly) that when this theory is appropriately contextualised it is revealed to have resources sufficient to overcome a number of longestablished objections raised against it, specifically those by Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler.This latter claim is intended to be the book's central thesis.The first chapter details some of the background to Locke's decision to include a chapter on personal identity in the second edition of his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694).The key trigger, according to Forstrom, was Molyneux's suggestion to Locke that he expand his Essay by treating the traditional metaphysical problem of the principle of individuation, namely the problem of 'what individuates, or makes distinct, an individual from others of the same kind' (7).Forstrom suggests that interest in this problem was fuelled by what she sees as tension between two traditional theological commitments, the first to personal immortality, the second to a future bodily resurrection.Both commitments are tied to the Christian belief that on the Day of Judgement we shall be judged by God for our deeds, and then subjected either to punishment or reward in the afterlife.The Christian eschatological vision was widely considered to form the cornerstone of public morality (for as one's future fate was held to be determined by how one acted in this life individuals had a clear incentive to act morally in it), but it was also widely recognised that it could only do so if there were grounds to suppose that the person judged on the Last Day, and then subjected to reward or punishment, will be the same person as the one whose earthly actions she is being judged for.After all, the afterlife can only be of concern to a person if she is confident that it will be the same person, i.e. her, that gets to experience it.Also at stake is God's justice, since God can only be just if he holds to account the very same person who committed a particular praiseworthy or blameworthy action.The theological need to identify criteria for the diachronic identity of persons is thus clear.And according to Forstrom, it was Locke's chief motivation in developing his theory of personal identity.Having sketched the background, Forstrom proceeds to offer 'a brief overview' of Locke's theory (22).She summarises Locke as claiming that 'the existence of a person is the existence of a consciousness, and the continued existence of that person is the continued existence of that consciousness' (24) and that individuals are morally accountable for those actions that can be appropriated 'by the extension of consciousness' back to past actions (25).In the process of her brief exposition Forstrom cites various passages (such as Essay II.27.22 and II.27.26) to show Locke's concern 'with explaining how an individual will be responsible for his or her actions here on earth after death' (28).This seems, to my mind, a perfectly defensible suggestion, and Forstrom seems on solid ground when she makes it.But while this aspect of Forstrom's overview is instructive, in general the presentation of Locke's theory that she offers in chapter 1 is basic and somewhat un-nuanced.For example, nothing is said about whether Locke offers a straightforward memory criterion of personal identity, as has traditionally been believed, or a 'memory continuity' criterion, as some scholars have argued.In fact there is no mention at all