The British experience with intelligence accountability

Abstract

Abstract This article assesses the British experience with intelligence accountability through an analysis of the principal mechanism that exists to provide for it – the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. It discusses the context within which oversight proposals emerged, the debate surrounding the nature of the new oversight body, and assesses the performance of the Committee over the first decade of its existence. It concludes that while the Committee has secured some important advances with regard to the accountability of the intelligence and security services, there are nevertheless significant limitations and weaknesses, many of which were evident in the Committee's 2003 investigation and report into pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In this context, the debate as to whether the oversight body should have select committee status, discussed at length in the article, remains highly relevant. Notes The author would like to thank Peter Gill for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author would also like to thank the Praeger publishing house for allowing this article to be published here as well as in the work edited by Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, 5 vols. (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007). 1 Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking 1987). 2 Paul Foot, Who Framed Colin Wallace? (London: Macmillan 1989). 3 Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Military History of a Domestic Conflict (London: HarperCollins 1998) Ch.4. 4 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Tories block inquiries into spying past', The Guardian, 27 March 1995. 5 New Statesman, 12 December 1986, p.7. 6 John Willman, ‘Secret Service Open to Scrutiny’, Financial Times, 25 November 1993. 7 Hansard, 22 February 1994, col.171. 8 Hansard, 27 April 1994, col.351. 9 Hansard, 22 February 1994, col.240. 10 Interim Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Cm 2873, May 1995, para.8. 11 ISC, Annual Report 1995, Cm 3198, March 1996, para.7. 12 Ibid. para.37. 13 ISC, Annual Report 1996, Cm 3574, para.6. 14 ISC Annual Report 1997–98, Cm 4073, November 1998, Foreword. 15 Ibid. paras.24–38. 16 Hansard, 2 November 1998. col.612. 17 ISC Annual Report 1997–98 (note 11) para.50. 18 Ibid. para.69. 19 Hansard, 2 November 1998, cols.596, 618. 20 Ibid. col.610. 21 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report 1998–99, Cm 4569, January 2000, para.34. 22 ISC Annual Report 1998–99, <http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm45/4532/4532.htm> 2 February 2007, para.79. 23 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London: Allen Lane 1999). ‘The SIS regarded Professor Andrew as a safe pair of hands [who] was also security cleared and had signed the Official Secrets Act.’ ISC, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, Cm 4764, June 2000, para.46. 24 Ibid. para.34. 25 Sir Stephen Lander, ‘The Oversight of Security and Intelligence’, speech at Royal United Services Institute, London, 15 March 2001. 26 ISC, Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, para.8. 27 ISC Annual Report 1999–2000, Cm 4897, November 2000, para.19. 28 Ibid. para.35. 29 ISC Interim Report 2000–01, Cm 5126, March 2001, para.15. 30 Ibid. para.34. 31 ISC Annual Report 2001–02, Cm 5542, June 2002, para.54. 32 Ibid. para.63. 33 Ibid. para.65. 34 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002, Cm 5765, February 2003, para.10. 35 ISC, Annual Report 2002–03, Cm 5837, June 2003, para.56. 36 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report 2002–03, Cm 5838, June 2003, para.10. 37 Hansard, 29 March 2001, col.1149. 38 ISC, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, Cm 5972, September 2003, para.11. 39 On this, see Mark Phythian, ‘Hutton and Scott: A Tale of Two Inquiries’, Parliamentary Affairs 58/1 (January 1995) pp.124–37; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity 2006) esp. Ch.7. 40 ISC, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, para.83. 41 Government Response to ISC Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, Cm 6118, February 2004, para.13. 42 ISC Annual Report 2003–04, Cm 6240, June 2004, para.87. 43 Government's Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report 2003–04, Cm 6241, July 2004, para.P. 44 ISC, Annual Report 2003–04 (note 37) para.146. 45 ISC Annual Report 1997–98 (note 11) Foreword. 46 Peter Gill, ‘Reasserting Control: Recent Changes in the Oversight of the UK Intelligence Community’, Intelligence and National Security 11/2 (April 1996) p.328. 47 Hansard, 29 March 2001, col.1149. 48 Hansard, 22 June 2000, col.512.