Parties, parliament and political dissent in Tunisia

Abstract

The Ben Ali regime (1987‐present) has disappointed the many who believed that the post‐Bourguiba era would bring substantial political pluralisation to Tunisia. While the regime claims to have taken significant steps toward democracy, close examination of the current political landscape reveals a very different picture. The press is neither free nor plural. The ruling party continues to monopolise politics while the opposition languishes. Opposition deputies entered parliament in 1994, but parliament's marginal political role minimises the significance of its newly plural make‐up for democratisation. Similarly, Ben Ali has raised the policy‐making profile of the Economic and Social Council, the composition of which is quite plural; still, its effective power over policy is insubstantial. Ironically, Ben Ali's reforms appear to be making the ruling party's exercise of power more efficient. By allowing more voices to be heard in politically weak institutions in debates that are neither open nor reported to the public, the regime can test the political waters for new policy initiatives and more accurately gauge the state of public opinion. Authoritarian continuity should not be understood solely as a response to Islamist mobilisation, for the Tunisian ruling party has never tolerated rivals. As long as the economy performs reasonably well, regime stability is assured. But in the event of a downturn, the lack of peaceful mechanisms for public, popular articulation of dissent means that over the medium to long term instability could loom on Tunisia's horizon.