Democracy Without Preference

Abstract

Is democracy fundamentally a competitive or a cooperative endeavor?1 Some voters, both elected representatives and private citizens, base their votes on parochial interests or desires, while the votes of others are shaped by the apparent best interests of the whole political community. Which of these, if either, is the proper task of the democratic voter? It is a separate question how one morally ought to vote, since it is a separate question whether and how democracy imposes any moral requirements or bestows any moral legitimacy. I do not address the moral question directly in this paper. Instead, I want to ask which of these tasks, if either, is given by the idea of democracy. The idea of democracy is a contested matter, but I shall take its core to be rule by the people by way of voting. This is not to say that voting is the most important democratic political activity practically, but only conceptually. Other features of democratic life, such as free expression, political participation, and equal consideration get their democratic credentials (though these are not their only moral ground) from an association with popular rule through voting. Is the Wisconsin senator's task to promote, say, the dairy in-