Journal of Mathematical Cryptology · 2009 · 30 citations · 4 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityCryptographySecurity ProtocolsCryptographic ComplexityInformation-theoretic CryptographyRandomized ComputationMac Security AnalysisPseudorandom FunctionsRandom Access Protocols
Abstract This paper shows that the advantage of any q -query adversary (which makes at most q queries) for distinguishing OMAC from a uniform random function is roughly Lq 2 /2 n . Here L is the number of blocks of the longest query and n is the output size of the uniform random function. The so far best bound is roughly σ 2 /2 n = O( L 2 q 2 /2 n ) and hence our new bound is an improved bound. Our improved security analysis also works for OMAC1 and CMAC which has been recommended by NIST as a candidate of blockcipher based MAC.
4
How to construct random functions
Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali · Journal of the ACM · 1986 · 2.1K citations · Full text
Decorrelation: A Theory for Block Cipher Security
Serge Vaudenay · Journal of Cryptology · 2003 · 177 citations · Full text
Improved security analysis of PMAC
Mridul Nandi, Avradip Mandal · Journal of Mathematical Cryptology · 2008 · 22 citations · Full text