Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules

TLDR

Competitive lobbying between opposing interest groups has not been studied in the context of federal agency rulemaking, leaving both its prevalence and impact unclear. The study examines whether federal agencies alter rules in response to lobbying and whether lobbying on one side induces counter‑lobbying by the opposite side. The authors analyze 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules to assess agency responsiveness and counter‑lobbying dynamics. Agencies modify rules to favor the dominant commenting side, but no evidence of counteractive lobbying was found, suggesting groups may advance goals by monitoring opponents.

Abstract

In the lobbying literature, the effects of competition—two or more interests lobbying on opposing sides of a policy debate—have not been assessed with regard to government agency policymaking. Consequently, neither the amount nor the effect of competitive lobbying is well understood. Using nearly 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules, we evaluate two questions: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? and Does lobbying on one side of a policy issue beget lobbying on the opposing side? We demonstrate that agencies change the content of final rules in favor of the side that dominates the submission of comments. Thus, it seems the “squeaky wheel gets the grease” during rulemaking. We find no evidence, however, of counteractive lobbying during agency rulemaking. Our results suggest that interest groups may further their policy goals by observing more closely the actions of opposing groups during agency policymaking.