Understanding New Cooperative Models: An Ownership-Control Rights Typology

TLDR

The article examines new agricultural cooperative organizational models from an ownership rights perspective. The authors argue that new cooperative models differ in how ownership rights are assigned to members, patrons, and investors, and propose a typology of discrete models ranging from traditional cooperatives to investor‑oriented firms. They define ownership rights as residual claim and control rights, and develop a typology that includes five nontraditional models designed to mitigate perceived financial constraints. Agricultural cooperatives have played an important economic role in the market.

Abstract

This article examines new agricultural cooperative organizational models from an ownership rights perspective. The article adopts a definition of ownership rights comprising both residual claim and control rights. We argue that new cooperative organizational models differ in how ownership rights are assigned to the economic agents (members, patrons, and investors) tied contractually to the firm. The article proposes a typology of discrete organizational models, in which the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-oriented firm are characterized as polar forms. The typology also includes five nontraditional models that cooperatives may adopt to ameliorate perceived financial constraints. Agricultural cooperatives have played an important economic role in market