The Nature of Psychological Explanation.

TLDR

The book, written by Robert Cummins, is organized into sections on Analysis and Subsumption, Functional Analysis, Understanding Cognitive Capacities, and Historical Reflections. It examines how psychologists theorize about human abilities such as calculation and language, and how good theorizing explains perception and cognition. The author approaches the topic by dissecting these sections and applying a theory of explanation to reinterpret established doctrines. The analysis shows that the persistent use of the positivist D‑N model has distorted philosophers’ understanding of psychologists’ work and obscured the true nature of explanation. A Bradford Book.

Abstract

In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of intelligence and cognitive capacity as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their students.In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections.Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book.